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Abstarct
Takâful is an alternative Sharî’ah compliant mechanism for conventional insurance system,
practiced in several countries in the world. As it is a new innovation in the insurance business
it has some Sharî’ah jurisprudential issues in its some segments when it comes into application.
It has several models in practice namely Ta’âwuni, Mudârabah, Wakâlah, Hybrid and Waqf.
In this connection, I intend to look into the issues of Mudârabah model under the light of Al
Qur’ân and Al Sunnah with the ideas of eminent scholars in this field as it contravenes few
Sharî’ah and legal principals. In addition to that, I tried to search into this issue At the end,
I forwarded some ideas and solutions for the issues.
INTRODUCTION
Islam is a global phenomenon and its
influence on society and economy is
ubiquitous. In Africa, Islam is the most
dominant religion and over 52 percent of
the population is Muslims. In Asia, where
over 32 percent of population abide by
Islamic principles. Muslims also comprise
approximately 8 percent of the European
population. All in all, 1.97 billion Muslims
live in 184 different countries, comprising
about 29 percent of world population in
2011 (www.muslimpopulation.com/world).
In the US, the number of Muslims has
grown from mere 10,000 in 1900 to over 1
million in 2000 and 6 million in 2010 (New
York Daily News, 3rd May 2012).
As the true religion of Allah, the most
merciful, Islam has to provide guidance in
every sphere of life. This guidance is not
limited to the spiritual and social aspects
but also covers economic dimension of
human life. Islamic economic system
supports interest free financial system. And
also commands the human beings to
commercial transaction with justice and
honesty. It directs the people right path in
financial matters.
All human beings are invariably exposed to
the likelihood of meeting catastrophes and
disasters giving rise to misfortunes and
sufferings such as death, loss of limbs,
accident, destruction of business or wealth,
etc. Notwithstanding belief of all Muslims
in Allah and al Qadâ’ wa al Qadr, Islam
provides that one must find ways and means
to avoid such catastrophe and disaster
wherever possible, and to lighten his or his
family’s burden should such event occur. One
possible resort in this contest is insurance
cover as available in the conventional system.
The eminent jurists, scholars and researchers
have invented Takâful Islamic insurance
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based on Al Qur’ân, Al Sunnah and related
sources of Islamic jurisprudence as an
alternative for prevailing insurance system.
In other way, as Munawar Khan, M.,
Naveed Ahmad, Iqbal, M.S. and Salmat Ali
(2011, p.286) say that the Muslims all
around the world wish to go side by side
with modern commerce. They are not
willing to follow non-Islamic practices.
They are looking for Islamic alternatives to
prevailing financial instruments and
practices. Islamic banking is a great success
not only in Muslim majority but also in
Muslim minority countries. Major
international banks are today offering
Sharî’ah compliant products. In the similar
manner Takâful presents an Islamic
alternative to insurance.
This Islamic insurance system is being
practiced in Muslim countries as well as in
countries which the Muslims live in as a
minority community. It is getting more
popularity among Muslims as a Halâl
product and among non-Muslims as a
reasonable and ethical transaction system.
If they see that the results of the investments
are good, and that it is not involved with
gambling, alcohol, and interest, they feel
comfortable with these principles.
According to Zurni Zainul Abidin (2012),
an agent for Takâful National Malaysia,
Takâful National has 500,000 individual
policy holders and 20 per cent of its
participants are non-Muslims and they are
seem to be more interested in obtaining
policies from Takâful.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Several scholars have written about this
subject in their literature. For instance,
Essential Guide to Takâful (Islamic
Insurance) by Engku Rabiah Adawiah and
Hassan Scott, Takâful and Retakâful –
Advanced Principles & Practices by Tobias
Frenz and Younes Soualhi, Fundamentals
of Takâful by Mohamed Fadzli Yusof, Wan
Zamri Wan Ismail and Abdul Khudus
Mohamed Naaim, Basis and Models of
Takâful: The need for Ijtihâd by Mortuza Ali,
Comparative Analysis of Islamic and
Prevailing Insurance Practices by Munawar
Khan, Naveed Ahmad, Iqbal and Salmat Ali,
Sharî’ah Issues in Takâful by Shahrul nizam,
An Analytical Study of the Potential of
Takâful Companies by Syed Umar Farooq,
Tariq Saeed Chaudhry, Fakhr-e-Alam and
Ghayur Ahmad.
But they did not focus their views on the
matter itself. Some explained the subject in
detail. Meanwhile others briefed it with other
subjects. I tried to focus the issue and explain
it clearly with the views of the eminent
scholars in the field, offering some
alternatives for the issues.
RESEARCH METHOD
This work is based on secondary data.
Secondary data has been collected from
several sources. Relevant literature has been
gathered from a number of books. Extensive
data has been collected through websites and
database articles. To receive objectives of the
study information work by different authors
and organization have been used. We have
used secondary data most of which is in
English.  Findings and conclusion achieved
by analyzing the collected data.
OBJECTIVES
To elaborate the Mudârabah model of
Islamic insurance
To evaluate the Mudârabah model of
Takâful insurance on the basis of its
jurisprudential issues
To offer alternative solutions for the issues
related to Mudârabah model
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WHAT IS TAKÂFUL?
Takâful (ÊßÇÝá)  is an Arabic word derived
from the root-word “Kafala” ,(ßÝá) a verb,
which means guarantee, responsibility,
assurance, bail, warrant or an act of securing
one’s need. In this connection, meanings of
Takâful as an Arabic word are joint
guarantee,  assuring each other, joint benefit,
shared responsibilities, mutually
guaranteeing and mutually caring for one
another.
In the context of Islamic insurance, Takâful
refers to an arrangement for mutual
indemnity in providing protection and
compensation to the participants who
suffered from perils and hazards.
According to section 2 of the Malaysian
Takâful act 1984: “Takâful is a scheme based
on brotherhood, solidarity and mutual
assistance which provides for mutual
financial aid and assistance to the
participants, in case of need whereby, the
participants mutually agree to contribute for
that purpose”
The Accounting, Auditing and Governance
Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions
(2004/05) provides: “Islamic insurance is a
system through which the participants
donate part or all of their contributions
which are used to pay claims for damages
suffered by some of the participants. The
company’s role is restricted to managing the
insurance operations and investing the
insurance contributions”
The AAOIFI’s Sharî’ah Standard (2007)
provides: “ Islamic insurance is an
agreement between persons who are
exposed to risks to protect themselves
against harms arising from the risks by
paying contributions on the basis of
‘commitment to donate’ (iltizâm bi al-
tabarru’). Following from that, the
insurance fund is established and it is treated
as a separate legal entity (shakhsiyyah
I’tibâriyyah) which has independent
financial liability. The fund will cover the
compensation against harms that befall any
of participants due to the occurrence of the
insured risks (perils) in accordance with the
terms of policy.”
The Islamic Financial Service Board (IFSB)
and International Association of Insurance
Supervisors (IAIS) give the following
description: “Takâful is the Islamic
counterpart of conventional insurance, and
exists in both life (and ‘family’) and general
forms. It is based on concepts of mutual
solidarity, and a typical Takâful undertaking
will consist of a two-tier structure that is a
hybrid of a mutual and a commercial form
of company”  (Engku Ali, E.R.A. and
Odierno, H.S.P., 2008, pp. 3,4).
Bank Negara Malaysia, in its website has
interpreted Takâful as follows; “Takâful
(Islamic insurance) is a concept whereby a
group of participants mutually guarantee
each other against loss or damage. Each
participant fulfills his / her obligation by
contributing a certain amount of donation
(or tabarru’) into a fund, which is managed
by a third party - the Takâful operator.”
(Shahrulnizam, p. 7).
When we think about what are the causes
behind the originating insurance as well as
Takâful, there will be a historical background
for that. According to Syed Umar Farooq,
Tariq Saeed Chaudhry, Fakhr-e-Alam and
Ghayur Ahmad (2010, p.55) the background
and reasons for emergence of insurance as
well as Takâful particularly are as follow:
The old order has given place to new and
the agrarian society has been transformed
into a modern industrial society. The process
of industrialization has been so rapid that it
may rightly be described, as the revolution.
This revolution did not eliminate the chance
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of loss of life and property. The develop
ment in transportation industry, the
increased use of machinery, all these are
followed by risks like accidents, hazards
and injuries. To mitigate the seriousness of
their consequences and to cover the chances
of loss insurance is pressed in to services to
such an extent that this institution has
become an essential of the modern life and
its influence can be traced in almost all
spheres.
Some of the important legal and socio-
economic institutions, which have
developed in the west during the last four
hundred years and have left strong impacts
on the Muslim society, are their present
forms and structures. Islam enunciates the
conflict with values and principles. The
course of history has forced these
institutions and organizations over Muslim
society. Muslim scholars and economists
are becoming more and more conscious of
this conflict and applying themselves to task
of wittingly the Muslim society. To achieve
this purpose, it is necessary that the
objective study of the contemporary
institutions and the law of Islam should be
made and then attempt to develop the
alternate socio-economic system, which can
fulfill Muslim need without violating the
fundamental principles of Islam. One of the
measures adopted in modern times for the
institutions of economy and finance is
insurance. It has a key role in present
industrial development as well as in large-
scale organization of commerce, industry,
agriculture and individual daily business.
Muslims regard the resources of various
kinds in this world as the gift of Allah,
which have been given as a trust in the hand
of mankind, to utilize them in most efficient
manner aiming to produce the maximum
output. There is a continuing surge of
commitment to revive of Islamic way of life.
The reorganization of finance and economy
is part of that commitment and involves
tackling the problems of daily life. Muslims
ardently desire to adopt institution, which
will further advance them to forefront of the
modern world.
All theories and practices covered by the
established field of economic are examined
from Islamic laws and values as enshrined
in the Al Qur’ân and the Al Hadîth (report of
the sayings or actions of Muhammad or his
companions). The economic activities, which
are permitted by Sharî’ah, are studied under
the Islamic economics, which does not
support either capitalism or socialism. These
principles are based mainly on the prohibition
of interest (ribâ), engaging in permissible
(halâl) dealing, and avoiding Prohibitive
(harâm) dealing, Prohibition of entering into
contracts containing uncertainty (gharar) or
speculation or Gambling (maisir) and
Payment of Zakâh. Muslim must also rely
on Allah’s destiny (Taqdîr) or dependent
(Tawakkul) of Allah for his subsistence and
security.
Takâful or Islamic Insurance is basically
based on the concept of mutual or
cooperative insurance and it takes care of all
the Sharî’ah related concerns including
ensuring investment to be made in Sharî’ah
compliant instruments. The concept of
Takâful as such is not new in Islamic
commercial law. Islam accepts the principle
of reciprocal compensation and joint
responsibility. The system of Takâful
insurance tends to achieve self-reliance
through a self-sustaining insurance system
based on community pooling, solidarity and
joint guarantee for the wellbeing of
community and individuals in need, the
entire system and operation being based on
Islamic principle. (Qaiser, p.4)
As Ramin Cooper Maysami and W. Jean
Kwon (p.7) describe on how the Takâful
insurance is being practiced. “Takâful
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insurance refers to an Islamic way of joint
guarantee in which a group of societal
members pool their financial resources
together against certain loss exposures. In
particular, Takâful life insurance works both
as (1) a saving instrument where participants
set their own target amount to accumulate
over a certain period, and as (2) a protection
mechanism in which all participants
guarantee each other against certain events
that would alter their financial status. In
contrast, Takâful non-life insurance works
more like a joint guarantee in which all
participants contribute their own shares of
premiums into a pool and mutually agree
to indemnify those participants who suffer
from an insured peril. Muslim jurists
generally agree that Takâful insurance is
accordant with the Sharî’ah, as halâl
concepts of tabarru’ (meaning “donation”
or “contribution”) and Takâful (meaning
“joint venture” or “shared responsibility”)
are deeply embedded in it.
TAKÂFUL MODELS
Basically, there are two main systems in the
Takâful operational model. One is the purely
non-commercial (ta’âwun) Takâful system.
In this cooperative system all participants
mutually agreed to manage their Takâful
fund themselves. There is no external
interference or management in this
arrangement. They are guaranteeing each
other with the Takâful fund, sometime, they
may engage in commercial activities within
themselves. This method is similar to the
traditional mutual companies. Generally,
Regulatory and legal issues and
complexities are lower than the operations
with commercial aspects. Nevertheless, this
method can be operated in a community,
where the participants are capable,
conscious and knowledgeable about
operational parts of insurance. And also
there should be funds available to start the
venture. Moreover, the government support
too needed to run the business continuously.
This system has been used mostly in Sudan.
According to K.M. Mortuza Ali (2006),
“Many Islamic scholars suggest that purely
cooperative or mutual form of insurance can
be the basis of Islamic insurance. In
cooperative model, the management and
control are in the hands of the members, who
are also the policy holders. The insured and
the insurers are the same people. The only
purpose of such a model is mutual protection
and security. There is no element of profit.
Surplus, if any, needs to be ploughed back
into the insurance fund. Contributions of the
participants may also be increased or
decreased as per experience of the operation
of the scheme.”
E.R.A. Engku Ali and H.S.P. Odierno (2008,
p. 43) say that the pure cooperative model is
one where the operations and profits are
completely self-contained. There is little
room for entrepreneurial spirit here and there
are significant difficulties in raising capital.
The model is normally used by government-
backed Takâful operations to meet the
specific needs of people in the country.
The other one is commonly commercial
(tijâri) Takâful system. In this system there
are various, different models have evolved
and are being practiced over the years. For
instance: Mudârabah model, Wakâlah
model, Hybrid model and Waqf model.
Whatever the mode of operation, there
should be some basic elements, such as
cooperation and mutuality, accountability,
transparency and lawful in Sharî’ah concern.
In this regard, there are some criticisms and
arguments on the concept and operation of
Mudârabah model in Islamic insurance
business. As it is the main theme of this
research paper, I will focus the matter directly
as below:
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MUDÂRABAH MODEL
Basically, in Islamic transactional law, the
Mudârabah (ãÖÇÑÈÉ)means: one person
gives an amount of money to another person
who will engage in trading with the given
capital for the purpose to share the profits
gained according to a pre-agreed ratio or
percentage. Currently, this system is widely
used by Islamic banks. The Takâful
operators also utilize this system for their
investment venture.
In this mudârabah model, the Sharî’ah
committee gener-ally approves the sharing
ratio for each year in advance. The sharing
of such profit (surplus) may be in a ratio of
5:5, 6:4, 7:3, etc. Generally, these risk-
sharing arrange-ments allow the Takâful
operator to share in the underwriting results
from operations, as well as the favourable
performance returns on invested premiums
(Shakun Ashoka Raj, 2007, p.86).
In this model, the main aim of participants
is not mudârabah. It is their secondary
objective. Therefore, the family Takâful
operators divide the contributions into two
sets, namely participants, special account
(taburru’) and participants’  account
(mudârabah).Further, Waheed Akhter
(2010, p.3) describes that in family Takâful
plan, Participants’ contribution is divided
into two parts. The major portion of the fund
goes into Participants’ Account (PA) that
belongs to participant whereas smaller
portion is contained in Participants’ Special
Account (PSA) that is used to pay claims
and underwriting costs. Entire amount of
PA and PSA is invested in Sharî’ah
approved instruments. Profit from PA is
shared between participants and Takâful
operator according to agreed ratios.
Profit and the amount in PSA are used to
pay for claims and underwriting costs. In
case, claims payments and underwriting
costs exceed the amount prescribed in PSA,
the loss is compensated from PA or
shareholders may provide interest free loan
(qard-e-hasan). In case, claims and
underwriting costs are less than the amount
available in PSA, the amount left is treated
as underwriting surplus and shared between
Takâful operator and the participants. In
Mudârabah model, Takâful operator claims
to share in underwriting surplus as an
incentive for efficiently managing Takâful
funds.
In general Takâful plan, there is no PA A/C
and participants’ contribution goes directly
to PSA that may be invested and is used to
pay for underwriting costs and claims. A
portion of PSA fund after taking into account
profit from investment can be retained as
contingency reserve for future. Any amount
left is treated as underwriting surplus and is
shared among participants and Takâful
operator according to agreed ratios.
E.R.A. Engku Ali and H.S.P. Odierno (2008,
pp. 33,34) explain the Mudârabah model that
in the context of Takâful operation, it is
observed that initially, money had been
contributed by the participants for their
mutual benefit and protection. In this sense,
the Takâful fund can be construed as
belonging to the Takâful participants
collectively. Once the money had been
contributed by the participants into the
Takâful fund on the basis of tabarru’, the
participants than appoint the Takâful operator
to be their manager by way of Mudârabah
contract to invest any available funds before
and after payments of claims and other
expenses (as and when they occur). The
investment of the Takâful fund in this manner
is to allow the fund to grow, rather than
leaving it idle while waiting for claims or
other expenses.
More specifically, when the participants enter
into the Mudârabah contract with Takâful
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operator, the participants collectively
become the capital provider (Rabb al-mâl).
The capital is the Takâful fund, which had
been contributed by the participants by way
of tabarru’. The Takâful operator becomes
the manager (Mudârib) to invest the fund
in a Shari’ah compliant manner and in
accordance with the terms of the
Mudârabah contract. If there is any profit
made, it is to be shared between the
participants and the Takâful operator based
on the pre-agreed ratio or percentage. On
the other hand, any losses are solely borne
by the participants as capital providers
(except in cases of negligence or fraud of
the manager).
Moreover, Mohamed Fadzli Yusof, Wan
Zamri Wan Ismail and Abdul Khudus
Mohamed Naaim (2011, p. 34) elaborate
that profit in Takâful is defined as returns
on the investment and surplus from the
underwriting in respect of the Takâful funds
only. Therefore, this does not include profit
posted by the shareholders’ fund. For the
family business it includes the mortality
surplus to be allocated to the eligible
participants as declared by the actuarial
valuation at the end of every financial year.
However, unlike the mudârabah contract in
Islamic banking product, profit sharing in
Takâful will be undertaken only after all the
obligations of Takâful have been accounted
for: the biggest factor is claim. In the event
of a loss or deficit of the Takâful fund, the
loss will be borne wholly by the participant
(s) as provider of capital.
An important feature to note is that under
the mudârabah model, management
expenditure is not charged on the Takâful
fund instead it is borne by the shareholders’
fund. Revenue of the latter is its portion
from the profit sharing of the Takâful funds
with the participants, and all returns on the
investment of the shareholders’ fund itself
(Mohamed Fadzli Yusof, Wan Zamri Wan
Ismail and Abdul Khudus Mohamed Naaim,
2011. pp.34 and 35).
Further, E.R.A. Engku Ali and H.S.P.
Odierno (2008. pp. 43, 44) say that this is
one of the earliest models of Takâful
operation, especially in Malaysia, during the
initial phase of the introduction of Takâful
business in the country. The Mudârabah
model is also known as the “profit sharing
model” . Two versions were generally
developed. One included only investment
profit sharing (sometimes called “pure”
Mudârabah); and another which also
included the sharing of underwriting surplus.
(Sometimes called “modified” Mudârabah)
According to K.M. Mortuza Ali (2006. P.3)
at present, there are three different systems
of Mudârabah mechanism. Some of the
companies follow a pure Mudârabah system,
where the participants and the operator share
direct investment income. Underwriting
surplus, if any, is distributed entirely to the
participants only. Some companies follow a
practice of sharing surplus of the fund, and
profit from investment is ploughed back to
the fund. A third practice is to share both the
surplus and the investment income between
the operator and the participants.
With regard to the eligibility of participants
in the share of the surplus, there are two
different approaches. Some are of the opinion
that participants will be eligible to participate
in the distributable surplus, provided they
have not made any claims or received any
takâful benefits from the operator, or if they
have surrendered/terminated policies. Others
feel that the participants are eligible to the
share of surplus if the claim is less than the
contribution.
It should however be noted that there are
some variations in the treatment of
underwriting surplus by some Takâful
operators in Malaysia, especially in the
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This arrangement is termed by some as
“modified mudârabah model”, as opposed
to the “pure mudârabah model” where there
is no sharing of underwriting surplus with
the Takaful operator.
earlier practices of mudârabah operational
model. In this type of mudârabah model,
the underwriting surplus is construed as
“mudârabah profits” to be shared between
the participants and the Takâful operator.
Diagram 1 – Pure Mudârabah Model
Diagram 2 – Modified Mudârabah Model
Here, the underwriting surplus is shared
with the operator. This model was a
necessary adaptation of the pure mudârabah
model at the time due to certain products
such as group Takaful, yearly riders, and
general Takâful having very little savings
element, thus making a pure mudârabah
model not feasible.
Under a pure mudârabah model, if there is
a loss, the rabb al mâl loses (some of) his
capital and the mudârib loses in terms of
effort. Therefore, the modified mudârabah
model is not really mudârabah, and that is
why some schol-ars, especially in the
Middle East do not condone it.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE
MUDÂRABAH MODEL
There are some Sharî’ahissues raised by
some Islamic scholars regarding the
operation of the Mudârabah system in the
Takaful insurance.  Notably Nizam Yacoubi
and Abdul Satar Abu Ghuddah, as well as
Accounting and Auditing Organisation for
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI),
have brought into question the use of a
Mudârabah contract in a certain Takâful
operations. The two main objections are
there. One its use have been the intermingling
of the participant’s contribution from a
Tabarru’ and Mudârabah capital perspective.
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Sharing of underwriting surplus leads
Takâful into a commercial business venture
instead of a contract of mutuality and joint
protection. Other one is the fact that a
Takâful or insurance operation creates
surplus not profits and therefore the use of
a profit sharing contract may not be
appropriate. It is argued that donation
cannot be profit sharing at the same time.It
is important to note that under mudârabah,
the Taka-ful fund belongs to the participants
and not the Takâful operator. The Takâful
operator therefore has no right to a share of
the surplus.
Some others put forward some Islamic legal
questions about this operation. For instance:
A.W. Abdul Rahim, M.K. Lewis, and M.
Kabir Hassan (2007, pp. 377-381), ask
some valuable questions in this regard. “The
basic objective is to pay for a defined loss
from a defined fund, which is set up
mutually by policyholders but is managed
by a Takâful company. The contributions
given are based on the principle of tabarru’.
A tabarru’ is a one way transaction in which
once the contribution is paid, the contributor
has no right to take any benefits out of it.
Rather, the fund is used for any participant
who faces financial difficulties or losses
within the time period as agreed upon in
the insurance policy. A number of issues
arise.
First, there is a question whether all Takâful
operators comply with the recommendation
to accept ta’âwun(ÊÚÇæä)  as a basis for
Islamic insurance. When people contribute
their money, they are usually expecting
something in return (i.e., financial reward
or profit sharing). There is consequently a
question mark regarding the true nature of
ta’âwun. Is it really cooperative in nature?
There are some operators using the
cooperative insurance model, such as
ICMIF London and NTUC Income
Singapore, but they are rarities. While most
insurers/Takâful operators are described as
the custodians or treasurers of the common
fund, most of them are more than treasurers
and, notwithstanding the words used, believe
that they are actually the owners of the fund.
Moreover, few of those who buy Islamic
insurance are conscious that the premium is
for mutual help.
Second, the relationship between the
participants is one of tabarru’ (donation) as
defined in the contract and not of Mudârabah
(profit sharing contract). It is therefore of
concern to Sharî’ahscholars that a profit-
sharing contract should not be applied here,
as a donation cannot be Mudârabah capital
at the same time.
Third, in a Mudârabah contract, a profit is
generated to be distributed (although there
are the usual concerns as to cash or accrual
basis for accounting). Essentially, an
investment on a Mudârabah basis of 100
should at the end of the period give more
than 100 to be termed as profit and for the
operator to share in that. However, profit is
not the same as surplus (excess of premiums
over claims, reserves, and expenses), and in
the insurance context, no profit can be
generated by definition so the question of
distribution of profit is of concern.
Nevertheless, the manner in which the
“mudârabah profits” are calculated and
derived in the so-called “modified
mudârabah model” has been subjected to a
number of criticisms. As depicted in diagram
2 above, the mudârabah profit sharing is
based on the “net surplus” in the Takaful fund
after payment of claims. The crux of the
criticism against the practice centers around
the definition of mudârabah profit and the
issue of whether the “net underwriting
surplus” can be treated as mudârabah profit
or not.
Generally, mudârabah profit is defined as a
surplus over and above the original capital
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Formula:
(Original capital + profit) - (expenses + claims) = net return
Simulation:
($5,000,000 + $250,000) – ($1,000,000 + $2,000,000) =
$2,250,000
after deduction of costs and expenses.
However, in this situation, there is usually
no surplus over and above the original
capital (which is the initial amount of
contribution in the Takaful fund), because
of the reduction due to claims or other
expenses (e.g. re-takâful costs and reserves).
What remains in the Takâful fund is just the
“net underwriting surplus”, which is lower
than the original capital, even after addition
of any profit generated from the investment
activities.
To illustrate the issue, say for example, the
original amount in the Takâful fund of a
particular scheme is $5 million. This $5
million is then used as mudârabah capital,
which is to be managed by the Takâful
operator. After investments, the Takaful fund
gets a return of say 5% for the year. This is
equivalent to $250,000. The expenses for
the year are say $1 million; whilst total
amount of claims are $2 million. The
calculation at the end of the year is as
illustrated below:
From the calculation above, it is clear that
there is a reduction in the mudârabah capital
from $5 million to $2.25 million at the end
of the financial year. Thus based on the
mudârabah contractual rules, there is no
profit to be shared for the year because there
is no surplus over and above the original
capital amount; in fact. There is a situation
of loss.
Nonetheless, from the conventional
insurance understanding, the remaining
$2.25 million is considered as “net
underwriting surplus”  and treated
conventionally as “profit” to the insurance
business. That is why, some Takaful operators
who use mudârabah model tend to treat the
“net underwriting surplus” as mudârabah
profit and share the “surplus” with the
participants based on the agreed profit
sharing ratio. This practice of treating the
“net underwriting surplus” as “mudârabah
profit” has been criticized as not complying
with the definition of profit in mudârabah
and thus, not complaint with mudârabah
rules generally. This controversy leads to the
re-naming of the arrangement by some
parties, from just mudârabah (or “pure
mudârabah”) to “modifiedmudârabah”. This
change of name is to reflect the different
definition and treatment of mudârabah profit
in the said “modified mudârabah model
(Engku Ali, E.R.A. and Odierno, H.S.P.,
2008, pp. 44-49).
Mohd Shahrulnizam explains the above two
issues in practice of Mudârabah model in
Islamic insurance business. The first issue
arises here is about the definition of the
surplus. Under Mudârabah contract, surplus
should be profit, and not the principal. Thus,
the operator is entitled for the profit but not
the remaining principal. What is happening
in the market right now is that, the surplus is
anything left after the total risk fund is
deducted with claims, and it includes the
balance principal.
The second issue is whether the Takâful
operator is entitled for the surplus (as
currently defined by the industry) distribution
or not. Let us assume that the operator is
using Mudârabah model for the Family
Takâful product. If the Takâful operator use
the Mudârabah model, it only entitle for the
profit and not the principal amount. In
addition, it must return the principal amount
back to the participant, a process which not
happens yet in the market. What is happening
now is that, both the Takâful operator and
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the participant share the profit (if any) and
the principal amount. (Mohd Shahrulnizam
Abd Hamid, pp. 18-20).
Whilst investment profits are clearly
defined as excess return over invested
capital, the same does not hold true for the
“underwriting profit”. If that definition were
applied, there would never be any
underwriting profit, even if there were no
claims (the return would then be zero, as it
would equal the invested capital or
contributions). Hence, it technically correct
to refer to underwriting surplus instead, i.e.
the excess of contributions over claims and
reserves.
Fourth, the sharing in underwriting surplus
makes the contract essentially the same as
conventional insurance contracts, where the
shareholders become risk takers and
therefore bear the risk and return from the
underwriting results just as any ordinary
business venture and not a contract for
mutual assistance with a fee charged by the
operators as risk managers.
Fifth, the requirement to provide a top-up
interest-free qard hasan (ÞÑÖ ÍÓä) (in case
of a deficit) in a Mudârabah contract by
definition is against the concept of
Mudârabah (even if this really is a
Mudârabah), which is a profit-sharing
contract, and the mudârib cannot be a
guarantor.
Under a mudârabah model the participants
as capital providers would have to bear the
capital losses, i.e. through their
contributions. The requirement for a Takâful
operator to provide a qard hasan in event
of an underwriting deficit (which is
essentially a capital loss) is thus not a
Sharî’ahrequirement. It was introduced for
practical purposes and only to deal with
temporary deficits that can be covered out
of future surplus.
A capital loss under Takâful can far exceed
the aggregate contributions of all
participants. However even as rabb al-mâl
(capital provider) their liability is limited to
the capital outlay. The question then is who
guarantees the claims payments under this
model? If the Takâful operator as mudârib
would provide an indemnification
commitment, it would contravene the
essential principals of mudârabah and would
not be allowed under the Sharî’ah. In practice
though, there is a clear expectation by the
participants that their claims will be paid in
full, as is the case under conventional
insurance. Hence, Takâful operators provide
an implicit guarantee through the qard hasan
promise. If the loan cannot be recovered, it
will have to be written of partly or in full.
This translates more or less to a guarantee
by the operator. (Tobias Frenz and Younes
Soualhi, 2010, pp. 142 and 143).
Under a pure mudârabah model, if there is a
loss, the rabb al mâl loses (some of) his
capital and the mudârib loses in terms of
effort. Therefore, the modified mudârabah
model is not really mudârabah, and that is
why some schol-ars, especially in the Middle
East do not condone it.
Sixth, because of a recognition that the
application of the Mudârabah approach to
risk sharing does not seem to be correct, most
new operators are applying the wakâlah-
based model as far as risk sharing is
concerned (especially in the case of general
Takâful and group family Takâful-type
contracts where the investment element is not
a part of the contract.”
However, the view of scholars and Islamic
jurisprudents, in particular those who have
been serving on the Sharî’ahbodies of
various Takâful operators in Malaysia,
supporting the permissibility of the above
model is based on the legal maxim where a
ruling is decided based on the understanding
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of the issue. In this regard, one of the
approaches used is the principle of ‘urf as
one of the secondary sources of Sharî’ah.
In Sharî’ahresolutions in Islamic Finance
published by Bank Negara Malaysia, ‘urf
is defined:
“…. As established norms and common to
the majority of people in a community either
in the form of sayings or doings. It is a
common customary practice which is
accepted and applicable as a legal basis of
ruling as long it does contradict the
Sharî’ahruling. In the context of Islamic
banking and finance, ‘urf iqtisâdi (a
common business practice) is considered as
a basis of Sharî’ahrulings…”
Guided by the above, the model recognizes
contributions paid by participants as ra’sul-
mâl and only in the event of a loss incurred
on the donation contract on the basis of
tabarru’. It is the ‘urf for General Takaful
that the actual tabarru’  cannot be
determined at the inception of the contract
until a loss occurs. Similarly, it is also the
‘urf that profit of the General Business
includes underwriting surplus for which in
the conventional operation it belongs to the
shareholders. As the surplus forms part of
the profit, under the takâful structure it will
be subjected to profit sharing to enable the
operator to pay for its management expenses
and should there be any balance thereof to
be declared as dividends to its shareholders.
The transaction as a whole does not breach
the doctrines of ‘adl and ihsân (Mohamed
Fadzli Yusof, Wan Zamri Wan Ismail and
Abdul Khudus Mohamed Naaim, 2011.
pp.38 and 39).
RESULTS
This study is a clear testimony to the fact
that there are some Sharî’ahand legal issues
in Mudârabah model of Takaful insurance
in terms of its concepts and practices. Since
there are some other models with the
compliance of Sharî’ahas a replacement for
Mudârabah model, it is recommended to
adopt those models to operate Islamic
insurance business.
As Said Bouheraoua and Muhammad Ali
Jinnah Ahmad (2011. pp.16, 17) explain that
under the mudârabah concept, two parties,
basically the capital provider (rabb al-mâl),
i.e., the participant, and the entrepreneur
(mudâarib), i.e., the Takaful operator, operate
on a joint-venture basis. The advantage of
the mudârabah model is that operators have
a bigger incentive to engage in efficient
underwriting and strategically invest, as they
will receive a portion of the surplus. A
number of issues arise from the current
practice of mudârabah model, however. Is
the mudârabah model really cooperative in
nature? Can the donation be considered
mudârabah capital? Is the mudârabah profit
the same as surplus? Can the shareholder
share the underwriting surplus, as is the
common practice in conventional insurance?
In case of a fund shortfall, is the requirement
of qard (interest-free loan) from the mudârib
in accord with the principle of mudârabah?
The issues and concerns about the
applicability of mudârabah as an approach
of risk sharing have driven some Takaful
operators to adopt the wakâlah model and
some other models.
This article gives a clear picture on
Mudârabah model which has being practiced
generally in Asia Pacific region of the world.
In this way it is an addition to the literature
on the subject and guidance for academics,
researches and practitioners to involve in
further research in this field.
CONCLUSION
After reviewing the vitality of Mudârabah
model, we found discrepancies that need
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adjustments. Therefore, Mohd Shahrul
nizam (pp. 18-20) suggests to Takaful
operators to switch from Mudârabah to
Wakâlah-Ju’âlah model, which possess
lesser Sharî’ah-compliance risk. Under
Wakâlah-Ju’âlah model, a Takaful operator
is entitled for a Wakâlah fee (i.e. Expense
Fund (EF)) and later also entitled for
Ju’âlah fee if there is any surplus. Ju’âlah
is a fee imposed on performance basis.
With a great prospect to grow ahead, we
really believe that this industry will grow
faster than expected. With the current
growth rate, and the opportunity from a very
low Takaful and insurance penetration rate
of Muslim countries, it has been seen as a
profitable industry in the future. Despite all
its great potential, it is also surrounded with
challenges and defection that demand our
efforts and focus to improve the industry.
Hopefully, one day, Takâful will be a
preferred “insurance” of the world, which
promote justice and balance life.
Furthermore, Takaful practitioners,
Sharî’ahexperts and government authorities
should have mutual co-operation and
under-standing to plan the strategic
solutions on the usage a particular model.
There is a constant debate on the usage of
the models, and this is always highlighted
when takâful practitioners come together at
conferences. Many have expressed their
opinions that the Sharî’ahcouncils should
come up with a standard model for use
globally. However, since different regions
have their own laws, having a standard
international model may be difficult to
imple-ment. Some do not accept certain
models that do not agree with their laws.
The jury is still out on when and how a
standard global model will evolve.
As Abdul Rahim Abdul Wahab, Mervyn K.
Lewis and M. Kabir Hassan (2007, p.395)
state that the Takâful system is still in the
process of evolving, with a number of issues
raised by various Sharî’ah scholars. It is
therefore desirable to encourage a process
of discussion and advance alternative
approaches with ideas that may come from
anywhere around the world. The ultimate aim
is to have a consensus model addressing as
many current as well as future legal concerns
as possible. Such a process seems to be a
logical way to move forward and ensure that
the Takaful at some stage is governed by a
uniform consensus-based model.
At a global level, two basic models of Takaful
are currently in operation. The mudârabah
model is acceptable as long as the operator
benefits only by sharing in the investment
returns of the funds. However, there are some
very serious reservations if it is applied to
risk contracts with underwriting surplus
being shared. These issues do not seem to
have a solution and hence most operators
now adopt the wakâlah model. The wakâlah
model has much wider acceptance and is
most suited to risk contracts. The Sharî’ah
concerns as well as some actuarial concerns
in a typical wakâlah model were identified
and some solutions proposed. Issues relating
to the sharing in underwriting surplus in a
wakâlah contract, and the issue of the risk
premium and operator fee outlined here,
deserve attention, as these can have an impact
on the results of the fund and the operator.
Sharî’ah scholars need to have discussions
with insurance professionals in an
environment not associated with a particular
Takâful client, as this could possibly lead to
a bias on the part of the operator in explaining
the intricacies of the insurance contracts and
arrangements.
And also, ijtihâd is an everlasting device for
Islamic dynamism. Modern Islamic Jurists
need to exercise their independent legal
reasoning to guide the Muslim Ummah into
the right path by exploring wrong ideas and
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practices of the current commercial and
financial transactions and to formulate new
ideas and alternatives for the growth and
survival of Islamic insurance system in the
contemporary world.
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